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COM MENTS
appeal the right is not assignable or descendible. An Appellate Court de-
cision rendered in 1949 indicates that the Illinois courts still are not prone
to free assignability unless clearly and concischl, set out l)v statute, as the
right to contest is not a vested one and no right existed in favor of an
heir to contest independently of statute.2 8
As seen from the above discussion, while there still remains a diversity
of opinion as to the assignability and descendibility of will contest rights,
it must be concluded that both the courts and legislatures are turning
towards a greater liberality in allowing assignability and desccndibility
of such rights.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE IDENTITY OF OFFENSES
. . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb. . .. "I
This clause, which is embodied in our Federal Constitution, bestows
upon us one of our most jealously guarded civil rights. It is well settled
that this clause applies only to proceedings in federal courts;2 however,
most state constitutions have similar provisions.3 This right to be free
from multiple prosecutions for the same offense did not originate in the
Constitution. It was well known in the ancient common law, being em-
bodied in the Magna Charta.4
The protection which this right affords is invoked by what is com-
monly known as a plea of "double jeopardy" or "former jeopardy." The
right is founded on the theory that repeated prosecutions for the same
offense results in persecution; it is such resulting persecution which is
sought to be eliminated.
All courts agree that two prosecutions for the same offense are pro-
hibited by the constitutional clauses, but there is an enormous diversity
of opinion as to the interpretation of the phrase, "same offense." The
reason attributable to this enormous diversity of opinion is that the courts
do not use the same criteria or tests in determining when offenses are the
same.
The test which is most widely accepted by American cou-r-_ is well
illustrated in the recent Illinois decision of People v. Htrrrison.5 The de-
28 Kessler v. Martinson, 339 111. App. 207, 89 N.E. 2d. 735 (1949).
1 U.S. Const. Amend. 5.
2 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Phillips v. McCauley, 92 F. 2d 790
(C.A. 9th, 1937).
3 I11. Const. Art. II, S 10 (1870) reads as follows: "... or be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense."
4 Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (U.S., 1873).
5 395 I11. 463, 70 N. E. 2d 596 (1947). For other Illinois decisions applying this test
see: People v. Flaherty, 396 111. 304, 71 N.E. 2d 779 (1947); People v. Allen, 368 II.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
fendant was charged, tried, and acquitted of assault with intent to murder.
Later, the victim died and the defendant was indicted for murder. When
put on trial for murder he entered a plea of former jeopardy, which the
court overruled, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, applying the general rule that
the test is whether the facts charged in the later indictment, would if
found to be true, have justified a conviction under the earlier indictment.
If they do, then the judgment on the earlier indictment is a complete
bar to a prosecution under the later indictment. Stated in a simpler
fashion, when the facts necessary to convict on the second prosecution
would have convicted on the first, a final judgment on the first prosecu-
tion is a bar to a second; but if the facts which will convict on the second
would not necessarily have convicted on the first, then it is not a bar.
This test is followed by a majority of the states,6 and is also the pre-
vailing rule in the federal courts.7
Thus, it is readily apparent that the test of identity of offenses used
by the majority of the courts bans the division of one crime into
separate offenses and the imposing of a punishment for each., It follows
therefore, that a prosecution for any part of a single crime will bar
another prosecution based on the whole or any part of the same crime.9
If the facts constitute only one offense, as when one steals several articles
of property at the same time, a prosecution for stealing some of the
articles will bar a subsequent prosecution for stealing any of the other
articles taken at the same time.10
But some courts have applied the majority rule illustrated in the
Harrison case so strictly that they are in effect guilty of splitting of-
368, 14 N.E. 2d 397 (1938); People v. Bain, 359 I11. 455, 195 N.E. 42 (1935); People
v. Greenspawn, 346 Il. 484, 179 N.E. 98 (1931); People v. Mendelson, 264 Il1. 453,
106 N.E. 249 (1914). It is well to note the old English case upon which this rule is
founded, Rex v. Vandercomb and Abbott, 2 Leach. C.C. 708 (1796).
6 Commonwealth v. Ladusaw, 226 Ky. 386, 10 S.W. 2d 1089 (1928); Common-
wealth v. Crowley, 257 Mass. 590, 154 N.E. 326 (1926); People v. Cook, 236 Mich.
333, 210 N.W. 296 (1926); People v. Snyder, 241 N.Y. 81, 148 N.E. 796 (1925); State
v. McGaughey, 45 S.D. 379, 187 N.W. 717 (1922); State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383,
106 N.E. 50 (1914); People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924); Hol-
comb v. State, 19 Ala. App. 24, 94 So. 917 (1922); Thompson v. State, 90 Tex. Crim.
App. 222, 234 S.W. 400 (1921).
7 Bartlett v. United States, 166 F. 2d 928 (C.A. 10th, 1948); Robinson v. United
States, 143 F. 2d 276 (C.A. 10th, 1944).
8 State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NAy. 473 (1912); State v. Cotner, 87 Kan.
864, 127 Pac. 1 (1912); People v. Stephens, 79 Cal. 428, 21 Pac. 856 (1889).
9 State v. Toombs, 326 Mo. 981, 34 S.W. 2d 61 (1930); Runyon v. Morrow, 192
Ky. 785, 234 S.W. 304 (1921).
1OPeople v. Perrello, 350 Ill. 231, 182 N.E. 748 (1932); State v. Douglas, 26 Nev.
196, 65 Pac. 802 (1901).
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fenses. 11 Thus, it has been held that on the basis of a single act of inter-
course, a defendant can be convicted of both rape and incest,12 rape and
seduction,13 and impairing the morals of a minor and rape."4 Under these
decisions it seems that by requiring slightly different elements, a de-
fendant can be made to suffer repeated prosecutions for that which is
in reality the same offense.
The second test of identity of offenses most generally followed is that
of the "same transaction." In applying this test, the subject of inquiry
on a plea of double jeopardy is whether the offenses were part of the
same criminal transaction. 15 If they are, a subsequent trial for such an
offense places the defendant in double jeopardy. The leading case apply-
ing this test is State v. Cooper.16 Here, the defendant had burned a build-
ing and a person died in the conflagration. The court held, in a somewhat
dubious decision, that a prosecution for arson barred a later prosecution
for murder because both offenses arose out of the same act. A later
decision 17 in the same jurisdiction reaches a somewhat similar dubious
result. The defendant was engaged in committing a robbery, when his
accomplices murdered the victim. The defendant was indicted for rob-
bery and murder. He pleaded guilty to the robbery charge, and when
tried for murder, pleaded double jeopardy. The court upheld the plea,
expressly rejecting the majority rule and applied the "same transaction"
test of the Cooper case. The court pointed out that usually, where more
than one crime has been committed by the same act, the defendant is
tried for the most serious one and if the state chooses to prosecute the
smaller offense, it is better that the residue of the criminal act go un-
punished than to subject the citizen to a second prosecution. Thus, by
pleading guilty to robbery, the defendant escapes punishment for murder.
The defects of this test become readily apparent when such a result
is possible.
In spite of such results, the "same transaction" test is being applied
in many other jurisdictions.' 8 Some courts which usually apply the
1140 Yale L. J. 462 (1931).
12Burdue v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 428, 138 S.W. 296 (1911).
13 Hall v. State, 134 Ala. 90, 32 So. 750 (1902).
14 State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50 (1914).
15 State v. Cosgrove, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 Ad. 871 (1927).
16 13 N.J.L. 361 (1833).
IT State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 Atd. 416 (1919).
18 Crane v. State, 39 Okla. Cr. 40, 263 Pac. 174 (1928); Phillips v. State, 109 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 523, 4 S.W. 2d 1056 (1928); State v. Houchins, 102 W. Va. 169, 134 S.E.
740 (1926); Coon v. State, 97 Tex. Crimn. Rep. 645, 263 S.W. 914 (1924); State v.
Covington, 142 Tenn. 659, 222 S.W. 1 (1920); Furnace v. State, 153 Ind. 93, 54 N.E.
441 (1899); State v. Shedrick, 69 Vt. 428, 38 Atl. 75 (1897); People v. Johnson, 81
Mich. 573, 45 N.. 1119 (1890); Trawick v. City of Birmingham, 23 Ala. App. 308,
125 So. 211 (1929); Ruffin v. State, 29 Ga. App. 214, 114 S.E. 581 (1922).
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majority test sometimes use the "same transaction" test.'" And, as might
be expected, where there is as much confusion as exists in this field, some
courts which normally apply the rule of the Cooper casc, have at various
spasmodic intervals, applied the majority rule.2'-
The Wisconsin court, in a slight variation of both of these rules stated
that "the offenses are not the same when there are distinct elements in
one which are not included in the other, though both relate to one
transaction." 2' Thus, it held a conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct
was not a bar to a later prosecution for adultery.
Other courts use what is called the "substantial identity" test. A
Louisiana court has held "the identity of offenses which is an essential
element of a plea of double jeopardy is not a formal, technical, or
absolute identity, but only substantial identity." 22 Thus a conviction of
unlawfully possessing and transporting liquor in one county was held
a bar to a second prosecution for transporting it in a second county on
the same day.
Other courts resolve the problem entirely on the basis of degrees of
offenses. Hence, it has been held that a prosecution for a higher degree
of an offense bars prosecution for a lower,23 and a conviction for a
greater crime bars a prosecution for a lesser necessarily included within
the greater even though, on trial for the greater, the defendant could
not have been convicted of the lesser.2 4 But an acquittal of the greater
would not bar a prosecution for the lesser.
2 5
What is considered the better authority holds that a conviction of a
lesser offense included in a greater, on a charge of the greater, will bar
a subsequent trial for the greater.201 Thus, a conviction of manslaughter
on a charge of murder operates as an acquittal of the graver offense.
1 Mullins v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 182, 286 S.V. 1042 (1926); People v.
Heacox, 231 App. Div. 617, 247 N.Y. Supp. 464 (4th Dept., 1931).
20 Hochderffer v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 215, 245 Pae. 902 (1926), (The court acknowl-
edges that the Cooper ease is tile law, but applied the majority rule.); Foran v. State,
195 Ind. 55, 144 N.E. 529 (1924); Estep v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 103, 143 Pac. 64 (1914),
(Tile court treats the majority and the Cooper case as synonymous.); Holcomb v.
State, 19 Ala. App. 24, 94 So. 917 (1922).
21 State v. Brooks, 215 Wis. 134, 137, 254 N.W. 374, 376 (1934).
22 State v. Roberts, 152 La. 283, 284, 93 So. 95, 96 (1922).
23 People v. Wells, 246 App. Div. 853, 284 N.Y. Supp. 953 (3rd Dept., 1936).
24Commonwealth v. Ladusaw, 226 Ky. 386, 10 S.W. 2d 1089 (1928); Barton v.
State, 26 Okla. Cr. 150, 222 Pac. 1019 (1924); 1 Bishop, Criminal Law § 1054 (9th ed.,
1923).
25 Gray v. United States, 14 F. 2d 366 (C.A. 8th, 1926); Mullins v. Commonwealth,
216 Ky. 182, 286 S.W. 1042 (1926).
2 6 Usary v. State, 172 Tenn. 305, 112 S.W. 2d 7 (1938); People v. Newman, 360
Il1. 226, 195 N.E. 645 (1935); State v. McLaughlin, 121 Kan. 693, 249 Pac. 612 (1926);
People v. Krupa, 64 Calif. App. 2d 592, 149 P. 2d 416 (1944)..
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But, if the first conviction was procured by the fraud, connivance, or
collusion of the defendant, it is not a bar.2 7 The theory of the exception
is that if the defendant had his hand in the prior conviction he was
never really in jeopardy. A diversity of opinion exists as to whether a
prosecution for a higher crime is barred where the lower court does
not have jurisdiction of the higher crime. Some courts hold it is a bar,28
while others hold it is not a bar.29 Such a problem will arise where a
defendant is prosecuted in a justice of the peace court and then latef
in the county or circuit court.
Another test of identity of offenses which is applied reluctantly by
some courts is that of res judicata. 30 Some courts use this test where a
strict application of the majority rule would work an undue hardship
on the defendant. 3' Apparently the majority of courts feel that res
judicata is strictly a creature of the civil side of the law and should so
remain. But whatever be the reason, the fact remains that this test is not
gaining in popularity.
In some situations, the courts have applied no test whatsoever and
the result is that in such situations the citizen can be made to suffer a
double punishment for one, indivisible, criminal act. Thus, if a single
act is an offense against two statutes, and a different element of proof
is required by each, a conviction under one is not a bar to a later prose-
cution under the other.32 Hence it has been held, that a conviction of
driving while intoxicated is not a bar to a later prosecution for man-
slaughter. 33
The same act may also constitute a crime against two governments.
If this is so, the law is well settled that a prosecution by one government
does not bar a prosecution by the other. Such a violation is regarded as
two separate and distinct crimes.3 4 The same rule applies where an act
constitutes a violation of both federal and state laws; a prosecution in a
federal court is no, bar to a later prosecution in a state court.3 5 Some
27Jonson v. State, 17 Okla. Cr. 558, 190 Pac. 897 (1920); People v. McDaniels,
137 Cal. 192, 69 Pac. 1006 (1902).
28 State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 N.W. 473 (1912).
29State v. Humphreyl 357 Mo. 824, 210 S.W. 2d 1002 (1948); Commonwealth v.
McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N.E. 633 (1931).
80 United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); State v. Cheeseman, 63 Utah
138, 223 Pac. 762 (1924).
31 People v. Grzeczak, 77 Misc. 202, 137 N.Y. Supp. 538 (N.Y. County Ct., 1912).
82 People v. Koblitz, 401 I1. 224, 81 N.E. 2d 881 (1948); People v. Nelson, 319 IMl.
386, 150 N.E. 249 (1926); State v. Garcia, 198 Iowa 744, 200 N.W. 201 (1924).
33 People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 N.W. 177 (1921).
84Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
35 Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377
(1922).
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states have statutes which obviate this unjust situation by forbidding
prosecution of a defendant who has already been in jeopardy for the
same offense in another jurisdiction.8" A somewhat similar situation is
presented where an act violates both a municipal ordinance and a state
statute; a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the
other.3 7 A single criminal act may constitute a violation of both the
military and the civil law, and the defendant may be punished by both
civil and military authorities. Hence, in such a situation a trial by a
court-martial is not a bar to a later prosecution by civil authorities.38
Generally, only one prosecution may be had for a continuing crime,
and where the offense consists of a series of acts extending over a period
of time, a prosecution based on a portion of that period will bar a prose-
cution covering the whole period. The offense is single and indivisible,
and regardless of the period of time, it is a bar to a conviction for other
acts within the same time.39 Thus, a conviction for desertion of one's
child will bar another prosecution for this offense for any period up to
the time of conviction. However, if a violation of law is not continuous
in its nature, a repetition of a prohibited act even if committed on the
same day, is a second offense and the plea of double jeopardy is of no
avail. 40
From a backward glance over the cases examined, it must be concluded
that the courts are in hopeless conflict when it comes to a solution of the
problem of what is an "identical offense." The reason for this enormous
diversity of opinion is clearly apparent from the cases examined. It is
because the courts are applying different, overlapping, and conflicting
tests to determine what is an "identical offense." A common yardstick
which would be universally acceptable has not been found.
It is submitted that when such a fundamental right is involved, a liberal
interpretation is necessary to assure the full protection of the right. This
seems to be the view taken by the Supreme Court of California, when
it recently held that doubts as to the meaning of a statute are to be
resolved against a construction which would result in double punishment
for the same act.4 1
8People v. Spitzer, 148 Misc. 97, 266 N.Y. Supp. 522 (Sup. Ct., 1933).
87 City of Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 374, 194 N.E. 537 (1935).
38 Welch v. State, 53 Ga. App. 255, 185 S.E. 390 (1936).
39 Commonwealth v. Peretz, 212 Mass. 253, 98 N.E. 1054 (1912).
40 Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1914).
41 People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184 P. 2d 512 (1947).
